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THE PATIENTS' BILL OF RIGHTS: MANAGED
CARE UNDER SIEGE
Michael Misocky
The primacy of the patient yields to a perverse accountability-
to inve!;tors, bureaucrats, insurers, and employers. And patients
worry that their physician's judgment and advice are, guided by
the corporate bottom line.
1
INTRODUCTION
In 1791, Congress enacted the Bill of Rights to guard against the tyr-
anny that iinfiltrated our nation's early history.2 The first ten amend-
ments were enacted to suppress governmental intrusion into the lives of
individuals. Certain rights, such as the freedom of speech, religion, and
association are deemed fundamental and guaranteed under the Constitu-
3tion.
Today, institutional oppression, in the form of managed care, threat-
ens our nation's liberty. The tyrannical managed care organization
(MCO) was developed to control skyrocketing health care costs.4 Al-
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School of Law in May 1988. The author is a Regulatory Review Officer in the
Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications with the U.S. Food
& Drug Adainistration. The author extends special thanks to his family for all of
their support. The author's opinions do not reflect the opinion or policy of the
FDA.
1. Patients vs. Profits, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Dec. 19, 1997,
at A22 [hereinafter Profits].
2. Se U.S. CoNsT. amends. I-X.
3. Se id
4. See Kenneth Pedroza, Note, Cutting Fat or Cutting Corners, Health
Care Delivery and its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 399, 400
(1996). One study accentuated rising health care costs this way:
The amount of money spent on health care in the United States is
staggering. In 1988, health care allotments comprised 11.2% of
the Gaross National Product (GNP), but only one year later the
ercntage escalated to 11.6% ($604 billion), an increase of $60
illion. In 1990, the United States spent 2,511 per person on
medical care, totaling $647 billion. Fgures show that we spend
far rmore on health care than other industrialized countries. The
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though monetary benefits have been realized, the effect on patient health
has been less than fortuitous.5 The MCO utilizes various cost contain-
ment mechanisms to suppress a patient's freedom of choice, a physi-
cian's freedom of speech, and a health care provider's freedom of asso-
ciation.6 The following scenario provides an example of the travesty that
percentage of GNP spent on health care continued to grow through
992, reaching twelve percent by year's end, and it is expected to
swell to sixteen percent by the year 2000. In fact, the percentage
of GNP spent on health care rose to fourteen percent by 1993, to-
taling $942 billion.
Id.
5. See Alycia Regan, Regulating the Business of Medicine: Models for
Integrating Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 635, 637
(1997) (describing the exponential growth of managed care organizations). Since
1993, MCOs have dramatically grown in number and expanded into new markets.
See id. In 1995, approximately 19% of Americans were enrolled in health mainte-
nance organizations (-IMOs). See id Likewise, it is estimated that 73% of Ameri-
cans who receive health insurance through their employers are enrolled in MCOs.
See id "[T]his increasing reliance on managed care may be traced to a growing
belief among employers and legislators that health care costs were spiraling out of
control and that the traditional medical system could not adequately contain those
costs." Id.
6. See generally Diana Bearden & Bryan Maedgen, Emerging Theories of
Liability in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285, 294-95
(1995); Ralph 0. Bischoff & David B. Nash, Managed Care: Past, Present, and
Future, 80 MED. CLINIC N. AM. 225 (1996); Deven C. McGraw, Note, Financial
Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians be Required to Disclose these to
Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1825 (1995); Diane Swanson, Comment, Physician
Gag Clauses - The Hypocrisy of the Hippocratic Oath, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313, 315-
16 (1997); David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to do Less, 30 U. RICH. L.
REV. 155, 155-64 (1996); see also James Freiburg, The ABC's Of MCOs: An Over-
view of Managed Care Organizations, 81 ILL. B.J. 584 (1993) (arguing that the
term "managed care" is misleading because it is not really care at all, rather it is a
comprehensive term describing a system of health care cost containment); Michael
Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical Technology, and the Advent of a
New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 331-32 (1996) (noting that
health care delivery is controlled in a variety of ways such as charging patients a
fixed monthly fee, called a premium, and limiting patient access to health care);
Barbara Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt
to the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1212, 1223 (1997)
(noting that MCOs can be anything from a simple association of physicians to a
more complex fully integrated arrangement); Pedroza, supra note 4, at 411 (de-
scribing the cost containment mechanisms used by MCOs).
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accompaniets health care in our nation today.7
Jane Doe, a woman in her mid-thirties, notices what she believes to be
a lump on her left breast. Concerned about breast cancer because there is
a history of the disease in her family, Jane decides to seek the medical
advice of a doctor. Through her employer, Jane is a member of a health
maintenance organization (HMO) which provides and pays for her
medical care. Jane is not permitted to see her regular doctor because the
physician is not pre-approved by the HMO. Instead, Jane must consult
the physician designated by the HMO.
Jane's physician suspects that she may need to see a specialist, but he
has already exceeded the maximum referrals for the month. Therefore,
he elects to forego the referral. Jane is unaware that her HMO provides
financial incentives to her physician to limit the number of referrals.
Moreover, Jane's physician would like to utilize a new breast cancer
test, but her HMO does not cover the procedure. Pursuant to his contract
with the HMO, the physician is "gagged" from even informing Jane of
the existence of the procedure.8
Thereafter, Jane develops breast cancer and the cancer spreads
throughout her body. Although breast cancer remains a highly treatable
carcinoma, if it is left undetected and untreated, there can be irreparable
ramifications. As a result of the HMO's failure to provide quality care,
Jane is left to suffer a horrible and tragic death from cancer.9
7. T e hypothetical was developed by reviewing some of the stories and
tragedies not:ed in research articles cited within this text.
8. See Swanson, supra note 6, at 314 (discussing gag clauses and their im-
pact on health care). The author notes that MCOs use a drastic mechanism known
as a gag clause to preclude physicians from criticizing managed care plans. See id.
at 314-16. ":Gag clauses are provisions in physician contracts which prevent them,
explicitly or implicitly, from giving patients information about treatment options
that may not be covered by their health plan." AMA Takes Stand Against Health
Plan 'Gag' Rules, West's Legal News, July 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL
382081. In essence, a gag clause constrains free and unfettered discussion between
a doctor and patient. See Julia Martin & Lisa Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical
Implications of Gag Clauses in Physicians Contracts, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 433,
434 (1996).
9. S&e, e.g., Darrel Rowland, Cancer Victim Says She Finds Managed Care
Unmanageable, COLUM. DISPATCH, Feb. 1, 1998, at A01 (describing Linda
Smrdel's fear that her MCO is going to kill her). "Her health insurer refuses to
cover a trealment she desires for breast cancer, which has ravaged her family." 1I
Both her mother and aunt died of cancer at young ages. See id "Smrdel's only
sister was 35 when breast cancer claimed her life one year ago today." 1, "In
1998]
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In his 1997 State of the Union Address, President Clinton urged Con-
gress to enact a patients' bill of rights.'0 In April of 1997, Clinton ap-
pointed a thirty-four member advisory committee to address whether
health care was driven by an inordinate number of cost controls." More
specifically, Clinton argued that patients should have the right to choose
their own doctors and be informed of their medical options.12 The Com-
mittee, comprised of doctors, consumer advocates, business people, and
policy experts, drafted a bill in response to Clinton's call for health care
reform.'
3
Despite apparent bipartisan support, the 105th Congress failed succes-
sively to pass legislation protecting the rights of patients enrolled in
managed care. However, there remains a substantial need for such leg-
islation. Specifically, there is a need to provide safeguards against the
hazards associated with the cost-control mechanisms inherent to man-
aged care. Such safeguards should: (1) allow patients to go to the nearest
hospital in an emergency, (2) guarantee access to specialists, (3) provide
detailed information about the quality of care, and (4) create a system
for appealing denials of care to a neutral party.14 A patient's bill of
November, at the age of 35, Smrdel got the news that she too has breast cancer."
Id. "Almost immediately, doctors removed her breasts one of which had a cancer-
ous tumor the size of a baseball." Id Her doctor along with three other physicians
agreed that such a bone marrow transplant was needed because of her family's
medical history. See id. Unfortunately, her insurance company would not pay for
the transplant, which cost between $75,000 and $150,000, deeming the procedure
experimental. See id. All too. often, the "experimental" language is being used to
deny treatment.
10. See Clinton Signs Act Streamlining FDA Approval Of New Drugs, En-
dorses Patient 'Bill Of Rights,' BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 21, 1997, at A16 [hereinaf-
ter Clinton Signs Act]; Marilyn Chase, Work in Progress, New 'Bill of Rights'
Makes a Modest Start at Protecting Patients, Pri-rSBURGH POST GAZETrE, Dec. 2,
1992, at E4.
11. See Chase, supra note 10. For instance, a number of the issues that the
panel was expected to address included allowing patients greater access to hospi-
tals, payment in emergencies, guaranteeing access to specialists, providing detailed
information about the quality of care, and creating a system for appealing denials of
care. See id
12. See John F. Dickerson, Dr. Clinton Scrubs Up, His Plan For Health-
Care Surgery is Less Radical this Time, TIME, Dec. 8, 1997, at 48.
13. See id. The author notes that Clinton's attempt at developing a patients'
bill of rights had more support from republicans than did his national health insur-
ance proposal three years prior. See id.
14. See id; see also Richard Acello, Kaiser in Coalition Backing Patients'
Patients'Bill of Rights
rights is necessary to ensure the safety and quality of health care deliv-
ery. Due tc the increasing number of patients enrolled in MCOs, if cost-
control mechanisms continue to proliferate, the result could be hazard-
ous to our nation's health.
This article explores proposals concerning the issue of patients' rights
and addresses the benefits and shortcomings that may arise if a patients'
bill of rights is enacted. Part I will present a background of managed
care in the United States. Part II will discuss some of the cost-
containment mechanisms utilized by MCOs and the resulting liability.
Part III discusses theories of liability in managed care scenarios. Finally,
Part IV discusses the issues that arise under managed care systems and
how those issues can be addressed through legislation.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF MANAGED CARE
A. Fee-for-Service System of Health Care
Historically, health care in the United States was provided on a fee-
for-service basis.'5 Under this system, a provider charged the patient a
set fee for services rendered.' 6 The fee-for-service system gave physi-
cians exclusive control over the diagnosis and treatment of patients.
Furthermore, it afforded physicians the complete discretion to choose
Rights in H11Os, SAN DIEGO Bus. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at 32. "[A] coalition of con-
sumer-oriented health care advocates and San Diego's largest HMO are teaming up
to propose a comprehensive 18-point patients' bill of rights for the millions who
are HMO members." Id.
15. See Gary T. Swartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect
Would Be On American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1359
(1994). Under the traditional fee-for-service system of health care, physicians had
no incentiv to contain costs. See id. Rather, the physician would often overutilize
to avoid malpractice liability. See id. "If a particular test or method of treatment
provides evem a five percent benefit to the patient, but at a much greater cost than a
more inexpensive, though possibly less effective alternative, physicians almost
always provide the more expensive treatment." Allison Faber Walsh, Comment,
The Legal Attack on Cost Containment Mechanisms: The Expansion of Liability
for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207,
211 (1997).
16. See Freiburg, supra note 6, at 584. The author notes that under a fee-
for-service system, the provider determines an appropriate fee and then bills the
patient or insurance company directly. See id. at 584-85; see also Faber Walsh,
supra note 15, at 213 (noting that under a fee-for-service system physicians exer-
cise exclusive control over the diagnosis and treatment of patients).
1998]
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the method and cost of treatment. 7 Although the patient remained pri-
marily responsible for payment, the patient's insurance carrier often
paid for the treatment or services.18 Increased utilization of medical
services and treatments provided physicians with greater profits and
shielded them against medical malpractice lawsuits.'9 As a result, the
fee-for-service system encouraged physicians to over-utilize treatment
because they had no incentive to control costs.
20
B. The Advent of Managed Care
Due to escalating health care costs, Congress passed the Health
17. See Faber Walsh, supra note 15 at 213; see also Vemellia Randall,
Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating
Patients For Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
1, 4-5 (1993) (arguing that "utilization review and financial risk shifting create the
possibility that patients may be injured in totally new ways"). The author states
that:
Before the new relationships were created, the only way a patient
could be medically injured was through the physician's conduct.
With the advent of the new relationships, patients may be indi-
rectly medically injured because decisions may be made based on
some statistical norm, not on the patient's individual condition.
Further, the patient may be medicilly injured by conduct of the
physician, not because of the physician's own decision, but be-
cause of a third-party payer's guidelines, with which the physician
is trying to comply.
Id.
18. See Randall, supra note 17, at 15. Under indemnity insurance, a pa-
tient's insurer agrees to indemnify the physician for the expense of a patient's
medical care. See id.
19. See generally Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 213; Randall, supra note
17. See also William Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed
Healthcare: History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 476 (1991) (dis-
cussing the impact fee-for-service systems had on malpractice liability and noting
that a physician would overutilize treatment because he could prevent malpractice
liability).
20. See Randall, supra note 17, at 15; see also Pedroza, supra note 4, at 404
(1996) (discussing defensive medicine and its impact on health care delivery).
Neither physicians, nor patients, are concerned about costs under the fee-for-
service system because a third party payor, who is uninvolved in the decision about
treatment, ultimately pays the bill. See id It is difficult to determine if defensive
medicine has substantially affected escalating health care costs because physicians
spend more money when over-treating patients as a means of avoiding liability.
See id. at 40 1.
[Vol. 15:57
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Maintenance Act of 1973 which promoted the growth of managed care.21
As defined by one commentator, "[M]anaged care is a comprehensive
term describing a system of health care cost containment that deviates
from the traditional health care delivery system by substituting pre-
arranged fee structures and utilization review procedures for fee-for-
service billing."2 2 Essentially, a managed care system attempts to pro-
vide quality health care in a cost-efficient manner, modifying the tradi-
tional fee-fbr-service system by involving a third party to the contract
between doctor and patient.23 The new contract between the provider
21. ve42 U.S.C. § 300(e) (1994) (amended 1976, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988).
The purpose of the Federal HMO Act is to provide financial assistance to HMOs as
long as they meet prescribed qualifications. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note
6, at 292. The federal government approves loans and grants to entrepreneurs in-
terested in cc-eating HMOs that meet federal requirements. See id. In order to re-
ceive financial assistance from the government, an HMO must abide by certain
requirements set forth in the Act. See, id The rules and regulations provide a
structure that the HMOs must follow to assure quality health care. See id. The Act
also requirei; HMOs to assume all responsibility for health care services on a pro-
spective basis. See id However, the Act permits physicians contracted by the
HMOs to asume financial risk for the rendering of health care services. See id.
22. Freiburg, supra note 6, at 584. Managed care systems share the follow-
ing characte;.istics:
1. a separate MCO entity that contracts for the provision of health
care services to subscribers or their enrollees (e.g., employees and
dependents);
2. a network of providers working for or under contract with the
MCO who provide services to enrollees of the MCO pursuant to
pre-letermined compensation arrangements between the MCO and
the lroviders;
3. a system of utilization management designed to ensure that
services are both medically necessary and cost efficient;
4. financial incentives to the MCO s enrollees to use the MCO's
provider network.
Id at 585 (citations omitted).
23. See id. In the United States, the traditional reimbursement system for
physicians i:; called fee-for-service. See id. Under a fee-for-service system, a pro-
vider determines an appropriate fee for his services and then either bills the patient
directly or his insurance company. See id. The fee-for-service system creates two
contracts, a contract between the patient and physician, and a contract between the
patient and insurance company. See id. While the insurance company may receive
the bill from the physician, it cannot lower the charged fees though the insurance
company may elect not to cover all the costs. See id The patient is then responsi-
ble for any -arges not covered by the insurance company. See id. The physician
therefore always receives reimbursement for any services provided to his patients.
See id
1998]
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and the MCO "limits the amount which the provider may receive for
services and restricts . . . the provider's ability to bill the patient di-
rectly. 2 4 A growing belief among employers and legislators was that
health care costs were spiraling out of control. As a result, this caused
the increased reliance on managed care. It is now estimated that ap-
proximately seventy-three percent of Americans who obtain health in-
surance through their employers are enrolled in MCOs.
25
C. Health Maintenance Organizations
There is widespread use of HMOs in the U.S. to contain costs in the
health care industry.26 Since 1995, nineteen percent of Americans have
been enrolled in an HMO. A HMO is "an organized system of health
care which provides or arranges for a comprehensive array of basic and
supplemental health care services." 28 HMOs often work on a capitation
basis: participants pay for services by a lump sum per month, regardless
of the actual number of services provided to each member.29 Under this
arrangement, the financial risk of caring for the enrollees shifts to the
24. Id.
25. See Bischoff & Nash, supra note 6, at 227 (noting the dramatic rise in
managed care enrollment over the last two decades and the significant increase in
the cost of health care as the major reason for the proliferation of managed care).
26. See Pedroza, supra note 4, at 408.
27. See McGraw, supra note 6, at 1823 n.12. From 1970 to 1990, enroll-
ment in HMOs escalated from 3.6 million to 35 million. See id. at 1823. HMOs
were implemented as the first system to attain the goal of lowering health care
costs, however, new delivery systems such as PPOs and POS plans have recently
emerged. See id.
28. Bearden & Magden, supra note 6, at 289 (citation omitted). HMOs are
health care systems accountable for the delivery, management, and financing of
health care services to a group of covered members. See PATRICIA YOUNGER ET
AL., MANAGED CARE LAW MANUAL 2 (1994). HMOs are responsible for preparing
medical services and treatment through health care providers and for covering the
medical costs of the treatment. See Bearden & Magden, supra note 6, at 290. For
a thorough discussion of managed care see generally GORDON K. MACLEOD, AN
OVERVIEW OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 4 (2d ed. 1993). Tie costs of treating the
subscribers are prepaid and either the HMO, the health care providers, or both are
at financial risk for the overuse of medical services. See Freiburg, supra note 6, at
585 (describing the alphabet soup of managed care entities and the roles they play
in health care delivery).
29. See Freiburg, supra note 6, at 585; see also Bearden & Maedgen, supra
note 6, at 293.
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primary care physician.30 When an HMO contracts with physicians un-
der a capitated system, the HMO places a financial burden on the physi-
cian for any medical costs which exceed the capitated rate for each pa-
tient.31 "'The most distinguishing characteristic of membership in an
HMO is that the enrolled [member] pays a [periodic], prepaid, fixed fee
for medical services,' rather than the traditional separate fee for each
medical seirvice rendered. 32 Thus, in an HMO arrangement, the patient
pays a fixed fee, while the HMO contracts with a health care provider
and pays for the services provided to the patient.3
The three basic types or models of HMOs are the Staff, the Group,
and the Independent Practice Association (IPA) models. 4 In a Staff
model, physicians are directly employed by the HMO, which compen-
sates them as salaried employees.35 The physicians generally provide
care "in one facility and receive the benefits of one administration, cen-
30. Siee Pedroza, supra note 4, at 412; see also Bearden & Maedgen, supra
note 6 at 2911-95.
Typical methods of control utilized by HMOs include: a require-
ment of some type of prior approval by the HMO on outside
treatient (with exceptions for emergencies); maximum utilization
quotis on physicians. use of outside services; financial rewards to
physicians or groups who meet quotas; and disincentives to those
who do not meet quotas.
Id at 294.
31. Se Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 6 at 294. The capitated rate is nec-
essary to ensure the financial survival of the HMO. For example, "[e]xtensive
referral to and the use of outside services and facilities can threaten the financial
survival of the HMO." Id As a result, the HMO provides financial incentives to
the physician to limit his use of outside services. See id.
32. hi. at 290. "HMOs have been sponsored by physicians, consumer
groups, employers, unions, insurance carriers, hospitals, universities, and commu-
nity groups. No set pattern exists 'regarding the internal arrangements for risk
sharing, utilization control, or administration of the HMO."' Id at 291.
33. See id. at 290-91. But see Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 208 n.3
(pointing out that under an HMO plan, enrollees are limited in their choices of
physicians). Enrollees must receive health services exclusively from approved
hospitals and physicians. See Malinowski, supra note 6, at 333.
34. See Pedroza, supra note 4, at 408.
35. See id; see also Freiburg, supra note 6; at 586 ("As HMO employees,
the providers must render virtually all of their services at HMO facilities to the
HMO's enrollees."). The "providers must be compensated ... on a basis other than
fee-for-serviice (e.g., salary) and must share resources such as medical records and
equipment with other HMO staff members." Id.
1998]
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tralized staffing, and equipment availability., 36 In a Group model, the
HMO contracts with a group of physicians to provide services for its
patient enrollees. 37 The physicians pool the income, share common fa-
cilities, and have access to most medical records.38 The payment ar-
rangement in a Group model HMO is on a capitation basis.39 Finally, in
an IPA model, individual doctors form a group practice that contracts
with the HMO to provide health care for the subscribers.40 Rather than
working on a capitated rate, physicians in an IPA model bargain with the
HMO for a reduction in fees for each service rendered.4 Consequently,
the HMO will provide patients with care on a discounted fee-for-service
basis.
36. Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 6, at 292 ("In a staff model, physicians
are employees of the HMO and a typical employer-employee relationship is estab-
lished.").
37. See id "In a group model, the HMO contracts with a group of physi-
cians (typically an incorporated group practice), rather than individual physicians,
to devote all or much of its time to providing care to HMO members at the group's
clinic and facilities for a fixed monthly fee per covered individual." Id at 292-93.
38. Seeid.at293.
39. See Freiburg, supra note 6, at 586. "The providers must pool their HMO
receipts and distribute them among members in a predetermined arrangement." Id
"They also must devote, in the aggregate, more than 35 percent of their profes-
sional time serving the HMO's subscribers, and, as in a staff model, must share
medical records, equipment, [and other supplies.]" Id.
40. See id. at 586. "The individual practice association HMO model is
popular with physicians because it gives them increased flexibility to choose the
services they wish to provide and poses less financial risk to members than other
models." Id "An IPA is made up of individual practitioners, all of whom have
their own private practices, but who organize to contract with HMOs for the rendi,
tion of health care services to HMO enrollees." Id. "An IPA generally operates on
a fee-for-service basis, though there may be exceptions where capitation fees are
paid for primary care services." Id
41. See id "Unlike a capitation fee, a discounted fee-for-service arrange-
ment does not impose a periodic limit on the total fees that can be charged for
services rendered to an HMO enrollee." Id. "The IPA must determine the method
by which its members will be compensated from HMO receipts and must enter into
a contract with its members describing the services to be rendered by the members
and the member compensation formula." Id "Unlike a group model, there is no
minimum amount of time which IPA members are required to devote to HMO
patients." Id.
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D. Preferred Provider Organizations
In order to compete with HMOs, doctors and hospitals formed pre-
ferred provider organizations (PPOs). 42 A PPO is defined as a "health
care delivery model in which physicians, hospitals, and/or other provid-
ers of health care contract to administer their services on a predeter-
mined fee-for-service basis to a defined group of patients. 4 3 "The or-
ganization usually involves a core panel of physicians, strict utilization
management procedures, and disincentives for patients to utilize a non-
PPO physician or hospital."" In exchange for lower rates, the PPO of-
fers a partiocipating physician a greater volume of patients.45 "The list of
preferred providers that the subscribers have to choose from is made up
of doctors who have historically admitted fewer patients and discharged
42. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 6, at 297; see also Pedroza, supra
note 4, at 409 (noting the similarities between PPOs and IPAs). In both IPA and
PPO Model HMOs, the doctor contracts with the PPO to provide services to .its
subscribers. See id; see also Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 158 (noting that under
capitation, it is advantageous for a physician to provide care for more patients to
increase compensation).
43. See Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 6, at 297 ("The organization re-
sembles traditional direct payment insurance plans in that consumers pay premiums
to the PPO, and the PPO then reimburses physicians and hospitals for their serv-
ices."); see also Catherine Butler, Preferred Provider Organization Liability for
Physician Malpractice, 11 AM. J. L. & MED. 345, 346 (1985). The difference from
insurance plams, however, is that "PPOs obtain discounted rates by contracting
directly with physicians and hospitals." Id. Members of a PPO are free to choose
physicians in or out of the PPO, but members only receive discounts from those
physicians who participate in the PPO. See id
44. Bvarden & Maedgen, supra note 6, at 297-98. "The preferred provider
panel is typic:ally comprised of those physicians and hospitals that have contracted
to provide services to the PPO's subscribers at discounted rates." Id "PPO physi-
cians are nol: salaried, but instead are reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis at a
negotiated or discounted rate." Id at 298. Moreover, "PPO physicians usually
maintain their own private practices and may participate in more than one PPO."
Id Thus, P]?0 physicians are independent contractors and they retain full inde-
pendence in Their medical practice. See id.
45. See generally Freiburg, supra note 6. "PPO subscribers are not restricted
in physician :hoice, but they have an economic incentive to select a PPO physician
over a non-PPO physician." Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 6, at 297. For exam-
ple, some phns provide for lower deductibles or savings account reimbursements
for selecting a preferred provider. See id. "However most PPO organizations pro-
vide at least some reimbursement for care received by subscribers from a non-PPO
physician." id
1998]
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them more quickly. 46 Arguably, a physician's medical judgment may be
skewed in a PPO because of the underlying interest in staying a partici-
pating provider in the organization.47
II. COST CONTAINMENT MECHANISMS UTILIZED
BY MANAGED CARE
A. Capitation Payments
As noted above, MCOs rely heavily on capitation payments to reduce
the costs of services. Under a traditional fee-for-service system, physi-
cians often over-utilize medical services in order to raise the amount of
money they will receive from a patient.48 Capitation largely removes the
incentive to over-utilize services because a "third party payor compen-
sates a physician at a flat rate for each patient enrolled in the MCO. 49
The fee is predetermined based on the number of subscribers under the
physician's care. 50 Physicians receive the same amount of money for
46. Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 6, at 297. "Where a PPO is involved,
medical decisions involving hospital admissions are usually subject to strict utili-
zation controls." Id. "Almost all non-emergency admissions must be pre-approved
and the lengths of hospital stays are closely moriitored." Id. "Unlike HMO physi-
cians, fee-for-service PPO physicians do not have financial incentives to limit
care." Id; see also Freiburg, supra note 6, at 587. The financial risk of overtreat-
ment under a PPO system lies entirely with the PPO, not with the physician. See
id. For example, under a PPO, like a fee-for-service arrangement, both a doctor
and the patient benefit from overutilization. See id. The only difference is that the
fee is discounted. See id:
47. See generally Faber Walsh, supra note 15.
48. See id. at 216-17 (stressing the lack of incentive for both doctor and
patient to control costs under fee-for-service care because they both reap the bene-
fits from increased services).
49. Id. at 217-18. Actuarial data along with consideration of patient utiliza-
tion patterns in specific health care plans and in the marketplace in general are used
to calculate capitated rates. See id, "Historical data or industry wide statistics are
used to estimate the utilization and cost of medical services per patient." Id. at 218
n.57 (citations omitted). The MCO usually includes profits and administrative
costs in the fee charged. See id. Consideration is also given to other facts such as
age, gender, and the type of group benefiting from coverage. See id. Setting capi-
tation rates and negotiating contracts under a capitated arrangement involve com-
plicated financial analyses that include knowledge of a physician's average fees,
utilization rates, and income. See id.
50. See id at 218; see also Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for
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each patient enrolled in the MCO regardless of the services provided to
the patient or the cost of these services. 5' As a result, physicians are es-
sentially encouraged to spend as little time with their patients as possi-
ble.52
B. Utilization Review
A second cost containment mechanism incorporated by MCOs is utili-
zation review, whereby the MCOs attempt to reduce the number of un-
necessary medical procedures, hospital stays, and tests for each
patient.5 3 Under this system, the MCOs appoint a board of physicians
and/or nur;es to review each patient's records. 54 The board, in turn, de-
termines if the proffered treatment is medically necessary and thus cov-
ered by the plan.55 Utilization review can be performed prospectively,
concurrently, or retrospectively.56 For instance, if the consultant finds,
Patients in Capitated Health Plans, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 301 (1996). Capita-
tion has been regarded as the "cornerstone of the health care industry octopus of the
nineties, for its presence can not be easily ignored .... ." John D. Blum, The Evo-
lution of Plysician Credentialing into Managed Care Selective Contracting, 22
AM. J. L. & MED. 173, 173 (1996).
51. For further discussions on capitation arrangements as cost containment,
see generally Orentlicher, supra note 6; Faber Walsh, supra note 15.
52. See generally Faber Walsh, supra note 15.
53. Se Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 182-83 (describing how health care
plans commonly require pre-approval of care so that they can monitor costs). Two
alternatives to fee-for-service include salary and capitation. See id. at 158. MCOs
that hire a staff of full time physicians primarily use the salary method of payment.
See id. Whereas, health plans that utilize a physician's services for a fixed period
of time usually use the capitation method. See id See also McGraw, supra note 6,
at 1826 (discussing the various utilization review procedures).
54. Se Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 216; see also Randall, supra note 17,
at 28 (noting that the review committee is referred to as "independent," because its
judgment at out whether a particular procedure is medically necessary is independ-
ent of the judgment of both the doctors and the MCO).
55. Se Randall, supra note 17, at 29. Utilization review reduces costs by
decreasing the number of unnecessary medical procedures. See id
56. Se id.; see also David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The Impact of
Managed Care on Patients' Trust in Medical Care and Their Physicians, 275
JAMA 1693, 1695 (1996) (discussing the alteration of the patient-physician rela-
tionship due to utilization review procedures); McGraw, supra note 6, at 1826
(noting that decisions to approve or deny referrals to specialists or to admit patients
for treatment are usually made concurrently); see also Faber Walsh, supra note 15,
at 217 (discussing retrospective review).
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retrospectively,'that a medical service provided to a patient was unnec-
essary, the MCO will deny payment or coverage. 7 Although capitation
and utilization review are the most commonly used cost containment
mechanisms, MCOs also provide payment incentives which encourage
physicians to limit medical services.
C. Payment Incentives
In response to the nature of the capitation system, physicians practic-
ing in the managed care context often refer patients to specialists. As a
result of these referrals, the primary physician reduces the amount of
time personally spent with a patient. Although these referrals relieve
some of the financial strain on the primary care physician, total health
care costs continue to increase. 58 Therefore, MCOs often "utilize pay-
ment incentives such as risk pools, bonuses and expanded capitation to
decrease a primary care physician's use of referrals, diagnostic tests, and
other services."5 9 Payment incentives control physicians' utilization of
outside medical services and encourage them to deliver cost effective
healthcare.6 °
Under a risk pool system, a portion of the physician's capitated pay-
ment is withheld and put into a pooled fund.6' Money deposited into risk
pools is used to pay the additional expenses of specialist referrals and
hospitalizations. 62 At the end of an accounting period, physicians receive
57. See Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 811 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986). In Wicldine, a woman was prematurely released from the hospital which led
to the eventual amputation of her leg. See id. A utilization review's purpose is to
control health care costs by reducing unnecessary services without compromising
quality in the administration of medical and hospital services. See id.
58. See id
59. Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 219. Payment incentives are used to
discourage medical treatment in one of two ways. The MCO refuses to pay addi-
tional compensation for extra treatment or the MCO rewards doctors through extra
compensation for limiting treatment. See id.; see also McGraw, supra note 6 (de-
scribing managed care's use of financial incentives as a means of limiting care);
Orentlicher, supra note 6 (discussing several types of financial incentives used to
limit care).
60. See Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 219.
61. See id. For a thorough description of risk pools and other bonus incen-
tives given to physicians, see generally KAY STANLEY, MANAGING MANAGED
CARE IN THE MEDICAL PRACTICE: THE PHYSICIAN'S HANDBOOK FOR SUCCESS AND
SURVIVAL 61-62 (1996).
62. See Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 219-20.
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any remaining funds in the risk pool. 63 However, if no money remains in
the pool due to a high referral rate or lengthy inpatient stays, physicians
will suffer the loss.
Another payment arrangement, the bonus payment, is similar to the
risk pool. Here, the MCO rewards the primary care physician for refer-
ring fewer patients and requesting fewer diagnostic tests. 4 At the begin-
ning of each year, a lump sum of money is set aside by the MCO to pay
for outside: medical services, as opposed to withholding a portion of
each physician's capitation payment.65 The physicians do not have to
bear the financial burden should the pool be exhausted, however they
are given an incentive not to exhaust the pool because any remaining
funds may eventually be paid to the physicians in the form of a bonus at
the conclusion of the fiscal year."
The final payment arrangement, extended capitation, encourages phy-
sicians to limit costly medical treatments by. including ancillary services
for each patient in the physician's allocated capitated payment.67 The
capitated payments for each patient include the physician's own ex-
penses, tests, referrals, and other medical services. 68 Physicians pay for
diagnostic tests and other procedures out of their own pocket, thus lim-
iting their incentive to utilize such services.69 The various financial in-
63. See id. at 220; see also Jan Crawford, Tort Law: The Appropriate Vehi-
cle to Control HMO Abuses of Gag Clauses, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1103 (1997). Finan-
cial incentives are given to physicians in the form of risk pools, whereby money is
withheld from the provider and then returned at the end of the year depending on
the number of hospitalizations, referrals, and medical testing procedures. See id. at
1108. Most importantly, in the risk pool arrangement, the doctor also bears the risk




67. See Crawford, supra note 63, at 1108 (stating that the physicians' ex-
penses in capitated payments force physicians to cut costs internally to increase
their net profits); see also Jennifer L. Myron, HMOs' Use of Gag Clauses: An Un-
ethical Threat to America's Health, 101 DICK. L. REv. 729, 732 (1997) ("Many
doctors feel that capitation presents them with a clear financial incentive to accept
more patients since many doctors are being 'paid by the head'.").
68. See Myron, supra note 67, at 732. If a physician ordinarily charges a
referral, this will be deducted from his capitated payment; as a result, the physician
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centives and availability of treatment options are not disclosed to pa-
tients because the physicians are prohibited from communicating this
information to the patient under their contract with the MCO.
70
D. Gag Clauses as Cost Containment
Gag clauses are ethically and legally destructive to the doctor-patient
relationship.7' Most gag clauses restrict the content of communications
between physicians and patients. 2 A typical gag clause reads as follows:
"Physicians shall agree not to take any action or make any communica-
tion which undermines or could undermine the confidence of enrollees,
potential enrollees, their employers, their unions or the public in... the
quality of... [h]ealthcare coverage. 3 Interpreting this language, one
commentator has argued that "if a physician were to tell a patient that he
felt the best treatment available was one that the HMO did not cover...,
this could cause the patient to lose confidence in the HMO." 74 There-
fore, gag clauses prohibit physicians from communicating information
to patients regarding available treatments and any financial incentives
being offered to the physician."
70. See generally Jennifer L. D'Isidori, Note, Stop Gagging Physicians!, 7
HEALTH MATRIX 187 (1997).
71. See generally Julie A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical
Implications of Gag Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 433
(1996).
72. For a complete discussion on the impact gag clauses have on the patient-
physician relationship, see generally Malinowski, supra note 6; Swanson, supra
note 6 (discussing the contradiction between gag clauses and a physician's ethical
obligations under the Hippocratic Oath).
73. Swanson, supra note 6, at 314 (citing a gag clause from a U.S.
Healthcare contract).
74. Id. at 315. See also John P. Little, Managed Care Contracts of Adhe-
sion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient
Health, 49 RUTGERs L. REv. 1397, 1445 (1997).
In 1990, Basile Pappas was diagnosed with a spinal cord infection
at Haverford Community Hospital. The emergency room physi-
cian determined that Pappas needed more specialized treatment
and made arrangements to transport Pappas to Jefferson hospital.
The ambulance service informedthe physician that Jefferson was
not approved by Pappas's MCO. Despite two hours of arguing,
the MCO refused to authorize the transfer and after further delay
approved a transfer to another hospital. The delay exacerbated the
spinal infection and Pappas is now a quadriplegic.
Id. (citing Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (citations omitted)).
75. See Martin & Bjerknes, supra note 71, at 441. Arguments for and
Patients'Bill ofRights
More specifically, as perceived by the American Medical Association
(AMA), gag clauses unethically interfere with the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. 6 Under AMA guidelines, "the duty of patient advocacy is a
fundamental element of the physician-patient relationship that should
not be altered by the system of health care delivery in which physicians
practice." 7 Moreover, another AMA guideline provides: "Any incentive
against the prevalence of gag clauses in managed care contracts include:
Managed care proponents argue that these provisions are not
commonplace and hence not a problem, while patient and physi-
cian advocates believe that their use is widespread and problem-
atic, For example, Dr. Peter Kongstvedt, a physician and-National
Prac:tice Leader of Managed Care Strategy and Medical Manage-
ment for Ernst & Young's Managed Care Group, testified before a
House of Representatives subcommittee that "there have been few
conocrete examples of unedited contracts that support the claim that
such inappropriate 'gag' rules actually exist" and that he has never
seen a gag clause m the hundreds of contracts that he has re-
viewed. ... Mark Sektnan, a legislative advocate for the Califor-
nia Association of HMOs, similarly believes that gag clauses are
nonexistent: "We do not believe that our contracts (with doctors)
have gag clauses."
In contrast, many physicians and consumer advocates believe that
gag clauses are prevalent. For example, Dr. Christine Cassel,
while president-elect of the American College of Physicians,
state.d that gag clauses are becoming more common. John Kaegi, a
spolcesperson for ChoiceCare .... reported, "[m]y understanding
is almost all, if not all, managed care firms have confidentiality
clauses," a particularly far-reaching form of gag clause covering
anything from discussion of unauthorized treatment options to
con'tact with patients after a plan has deselected a physician....
Aynah Askanas, legal counsel for the California Medical Associa-
tion (CMA), reviews contracts for physicians. She claims to have
found gag clauses prohibiting a physician from making negative
comments about the plan in approximately twenty percent of all
the contracts she has reviewed.
Id. at 441-42 (citations omitted).
76. ,S;ee Swanson, supra note 6, at 318.
The nature of the relationship presents the opportunity for influ-
ence and abuse as patients rely upon guidance from their physi-
ciarts. Patients neither have the skill nor the ability to fully under-
stand and evaluate their conditions. They therefore rely upon phy-
sicin;ms to place their interests and needs first without the threat of
compromise. When physicians are being inffuenced in their medi-
cal choices by an HMO and through the financial incentives that
the plan provides, the patient can no longer be sure that they are
receiving the best possible treatment .... These gag clauses lead
to an ethical erosion of the confidence we place in physicians and
an overall decrease in the quality of care so that entities can make
a profit. Though these conflicts of interest have not seriously un-
dernined the patient's trust in physicians, the potential is there.
Id.
77. Ngancy J. Picinic, Note, Physicians Bound and Gagged: Federal At-
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to limit care must be disclosed fully to patients by plan administrators
on enrollment and at least annually thereafter."78 Contrary to their ethi-
cal obligation, some critics assert that physicians, in order to secure pa-
tients, are left with no alternative but to sign the contract with the
MCO.7 9 A physician placed in this ethical dilemma should seek refuge
under the AMA Code which "may be used in shielding physicians from
termination for upholding ethical principles despite contractual provi-
sions to the contrary."
80
A final attack on gag clauses may come from the doctrine of informed
consent.8 1 The informed consent doctrine requires patients to be in-
formed of all facts "which are necessary to form the basis of an intelli-
gent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment." 82 Physicians are
under a legal duty to inform patients of the risks, benefits, and alterna-
tives of proposed treatments. The patient is then free to choose among
the alternatives. 83
Significant scholarly debate surrounds the question of whether the
informed consent doctrine requires a physician to disclose to a patient
the existence of financial incentives to limit care.8 4 In Moore v. Regents
tempts to Combat Managed Care's Use of Gag Clauses, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
567, 601 n.159 (1997) (citing Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American
Medical Association, Ethical Issues in Managed Care, reprinted in 273 JAMA
330,331 (1995)).
78. See Picinic, supra note 77, at 601 n. 160.
79. See Noah, supra note 6, at 1264; see also Little, supra note 74, at 1427-
28 (1997) (arguing that physicians are left with no choice but to sign the MCO
contract).
80. Picinic, supra note 77, at 603 n.167.
81. See id see also Justin D. Harris, The Timely Demise of "Gag Orders" in
Physicians' Contracts with Managed Care Providers, 28 PAC. L.J. 906, 907 (1997)
(discussing several state attempts to eliminate the use of gag clauses). But see
Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511
(1996) (outlining an alternative to the conventional informed consent doctrine).
82. McGraw, supra note 6, at 1841. Regardless whether the doctrine of
informed consent would compel the disclosure of financial incentives "[w]hen
making a determination regarding a person's life, most would agree that all infor-
mation about any medical alternatives is imperative in order for the patient to make
an informed decision and to consent to a particular treatment." Swanson, supra
note 6, at 320.
83. See McGraw, supra note 6, at 1840.
84. See, e.g., id; Swanson, supra note 6, at 319; Harris, supra note 81, at
907. See generally Hall, supra note 81 (outlining an alternative to the conventional
informed consent doctrine).
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of University of California,s5 the California Supreme Court utilized the
doctrine of informed consent to hold that "a physician must disclose
personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or
economic, that may affect the physician's professional judgment."
86
Nonetheloss, the informed consent doctrine provides an inadequate rem-
edy, because it only grants retrospective relief
87
In many cases, the patient died or was injured as a result of the physi-
cian's failure to disclose. Moreover, the patient bears the difficult bur-
den of prDving that the physician's failure to disclose the financial in-
centives proximately caused the harm.88 Due to the inherent difficulty of
proof and the gravity of potential harm, many state legislatures enacted
full disclosure laws.89 The continued use of gag clauses as a cost con-
85. '793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
86. Id. at 483; see also McGraw, supra note 6, at 1840.
87. gee McGraw, supra note 6, at 1843. More specifically, the patient
would bear the burden of proving:
(1) that the doctrine of informed consent has been breached be-
cause the physician did not disclose that she was compensated
through a financial incentive arrangement;
(2) that the patient was harmed, and that this harm was proxi-
mat~ely caused by this breach;
(3) that if the patient had been informed about the existence of the
arrangement, he would have sought care from another provider
using his own resources or that he would have actively petitioned
the health plan for the treatment through its established grievance
procedures.
Id; see also Picinic, supra note 77, at 391 n.132.
[Ift informed consent can be applied to the disclosure of capitation
arrangements, it must still be established not only that the patient
would have chosen the other undisclosed, more costly alternative,
but also that the alternative would have resulted in a more advan-
tageous outcome and that the less costly treatment was medically
inappropriate.
Id The problems inherent in the plaintiff's burden is that it is nearly impossible to
show that had the patient been informed of the physician's financial incentive to
provide le;s care, they would have, nonetheless, sought the additional services. See
id This 'proof' is highly speculative at best. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Swanson, supra note 6, at 327-32. For example, Massachusetts
enacted a law prohibiting MCOs from refusing to contract with physicians who in
good faith communicated with patients regarding MCO terms or provisions. See
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 108 (West Supp. 1996). Colorado enacted a
bill attacking gag clauses by prohibiting MCOs from terminating physicians for
communications with patients. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-121 (West
Supp. 1996) (formerly H.B. 1216). Virginia law requires that "a contract between
a carrier [vCO] and a provider [physician] shall permit and require the provider to
1998]
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tainment mechanism will harm patients and encourage efforts to impose
liability on the MCOs.
III. EMERGING THEORIES OF LIABILITY IN MANAGED CARE
Providing quality health care to a patient while attempting to contain
costs results in expanded liability for physicians and MCOs. 90 Injured
patients claim that cost containment mechanisms influence a physician's
judgment to limit or deny treatment.91 Patients bring common causes of
action such as negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract,
and tortious interference with the patient-physician relationship to allege
that cost containment mechanisms are the cause of their injury.92 Diffi-
culty arises when the MCO makes a decision to deny treatment or a phy-
sician decides to stop treating a patient.93 Under these circumstances, it
becomes problematic to determine who is responsible for the patient's
injury. The following cases address who is liable when negligent utili-
zation review results in injury to a patient.
A. Wickline v. California
Wickline v. California 94 is the leading case on whether a primary care
physician and/or MCO may be held liable for a denial of necessary
medical treatment. 95 In this highly publicized case, the plaintiff alleged
discuss medical treatment options with the patient." 1996 Va. Acts ch. 1393.
90. See generally Beardan & Maedgen, supra note 6 (noting the recent
expansion toward liability in the managed care setting).
91. See id. at 325. As part of its efforts at cost control, an HMO typically
monitors and prospectively authorizes or denies medical treatment, including non-
emergency hospitalizations and lengths of hospital stays. See id "[Tihis more
extensive involvement in the health care process may expose the HMO to liability
on the grounds of negligent interference with the health care decision making proc-
ess." Id.
92. See id In addition, theories of liability have included breach of contract,
false/misleading advertising, insurance bad faith claims, and ostensible and appar-
ent agency. See generally Orentlicher, supra note 6; Faber Walsh, supra note 15
(noting the various claims plaintiffs have brought against insurance companies).
93. See Beardan & Maedgen, supra note 6, at 325. "The HMO, in its func-
tion as rationer of medical services, may refuse to authorize certain treatments or
services that are medically unnecessary." Id. "If in hindsight, such denial of
treatment results in injury to the patient, the HMO may risk liability on the basis of
having negligently refused a necessary medical procedure." Id
94. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
95. See id. at 811 (discussing the risks associated with prospective review as
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that the MCO's cost containment mechanism was the basis of the denial
of treatment, directly and proximately causing her injury.96 The patient,
Lois Wickline, was diagnosed with Leriche's Syndrome9 7 and forced to
undergo surgical treatment.98 Her physician concluded that due to
Wickline's unstable condition, she had to remain in the hospital.99 How-
ever, a Medi-Cal consultant denied the treating physician's request for
the additional hospital stay. 00 Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Wickline devel-
oped gangrene in her leg and had to return to the hospital to have it am-
putated.' 10
Wickline sued the state of California claiming that Medi-Cal was
opposed to retrospective review). The court explained that "a mistaken conclusion
about medical necessity following retrospective review will result in the wrongful
withholding of payment." Id. at 811-12. An erroneous decision in a prospective
review, on the other hand, results in the withholding of care, which could poten-
tially lead to a patient's disability or death. See id
96. See id at 810-11.
97. Leriche's Syndrome is a condition caused by an obstruction of the ter-
minal aorta, which carries blood from the heart to the arteries in all organs and
parts of the body. See id. at 812.
98. S ee Wicldine, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 812. Surgery was performed to remove
Mrs. Wickline's artery and replace it with a synthetic artery. See id. After surgery,
Mrs. Wickline experienced circulatory problems in her leg. See id. She was taken
back to surgery to remove a clot that had formed and the graft was resewn. See id
Mrs. Wickline's recovery was "stormy" and she was operated on again, in order to
remove a section of the chain of nerves that lie on each side of the spinal column.
See id
99. See id. at 813. Mrs. Wickline's physician felt that it was medically nec-
essary for her to remain in the hospital because she was at risk for blood clotting
and infection. See Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
100. See id. at 814. In a prospective review, an independent committee
reviews the proposed treatment to determine whether it is medically necessary. See
id. at 813. The physician's request for an additional eight days was reviewed by a
nurse who had the authority to approve an extension but had to seek Medi-Cal's
approval fcr an extension. See id. at 814. The nurse called a Medi-Cal consultant
and said that in her opinion, nothing in Wickline's case warranted an eight-day
extension. See id. Subsequently, a board certified surgeon employed by Medi-Cal
rejected Mrs. Wickline's request and instead authorized only four additional days.
See id
101. See Wicldine, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 816. Once Mrs. Wickline arrived
home she started feeling pain in her right leg and the leg started to take a whitish,
"statute-like marble appearance." Id. Her symptoms worsened and on the ninth
day following her release, she was forced to return to the hospital. See id.
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negligent in denying the request for an extended hospital stay. 02 A jury
found for Wickline and awarded her $500,000. However, the Court of
Appeals of California reversed the decision and held that Medi-Cal was
not liable for medical malpractice as a matter of law. 0 3 The court rea-
soned that a patient's physician is solely responsible for determining the
medical necessity of a patient's treatment.10 4 More specifically, the court
stated that "a physician is in a much better position to evaluate and di-
agnose a patient's condition and therefore has the ultimate responsibility
for medical decisions."'
05
Although the court held the treating physician responsible for Wick-
line's injuries, the court did not rule out third party payor liability. In
fact, the court opened the door to MCO liability when cost containment
mechanisms result in harm to the patient. 0 6 Finally, the court concluded
that cost containment mechanisms should not be allowed to interfere
with a physician's judgment.
10 7
102. Seeid. at 811.
103. See id. at 820. Although the California Court of Appeals found in
favor of the State, it opened the door to MCO liability by holding:
The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when care
which should have been provided is not provided should recover
for the injuries suffered from all those responsible for the depriva-
tion of such care, including when appropriate, health care payers.
Third party payers of health care services can be held legally ac-
countable when medically inappropriate decisions result from de-
fects in the design or implementation of cost containment mecha-
nisms as, for example, when appeals made on a patient's behalf
for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably
disregarded or overridden.
Id. at 810.
104. See Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 810. However after opening the door
to MCO liability, the court qualified its holding.
[T]he physician who complies without protest with the limitations
imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dic-
tates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his
patient's care. He cannot point to the health care payer as the li-
ability scapegoat when the consequences of his own determinative
medical decisions go sour.Id
105. Id; see also Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO
Malpractice, and Enterprise Liability, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 34 (1996) (stressing
the importance of the Wickline decision with respect to HMO liability).
106. See Wicldine, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819. The Court essentially opened the
courtroom doors to MCO liability when cost containment mechanisms influence a
physicians judgment whether or not to render care to the patient and the patient is
harmed as a result. See id.
107. See id. at 820.
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B. Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California
A later decision of the Court of Appeals of California held contrary to
Wickline. In Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California, l0 the plaintiff,
Howard Wilson, was admitted to a hospital while suffering from ano-
rexia, severe depression, and drug dependency. 0 9 After spending eleven
days in the hospital, Wilson's treating physician determined that three to
four weeks of additional in-patient care was required." 0 However, Blue
Cross refised to authorize that length of stay."' Unable to afford the
costs on his own, Wilson was released from the hospital. Twenty days
after his release, he committed suicide. 12 Wilson's parents brought suit
against the insurance companies for breach of the insurance contract,
negligence, and wrongful death.
The trial court, relying on Wickline, concluded that Wilson's treating
physician was solely responsible for his death and granted the insurance
companie;' summary judgment motions." 3 The California Court of Ap-
peals reversed the decision and remanded it to the trial court. The court
held that the insurance companies were not entitled to summary judg-
ment.' 4 Ultimately, Western Medical, the review entity used by Blue
Cross, settled the suit with Wilson's parents and a jury found the insur-
ance companies liable for breach of contract." 5 Most notably, the Court
108. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
109. See id. at 877.
110. See id Howard Wilson's physician determined that he needed an
additional three to four weeks of psychological assessment and care at the hospital
rather than being discharged as the insurance company wanted. See id.
111. See id. Blue Cross hired Western Medical to conduct a concurrent
utilization review. See id Concurrent utilization review involves constant moni-
toring of the patient throughout treatment, and if any referral to a specialist, diag-
nostic test or treatment is deemed not medically necessary, the patient will be de-
nied benefits. See J. Scott Anderson, Is Utilization Review the Practice of Medi-
cine?, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 431, 434 (1998).
112. See Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
113. See id. The court of appeals disagreed by holding that the physician's
failure to pursue an appeal to the denial of Wilson's benefits did not warrant a
summary judgment for the defendants. See id. The Court also emphasized that the
defendants failed to prove that the request for further hospital stay would have been
granted had Wilson's physicians appealed. See id.
114. See id The court of appeals relied on the treating physician's testi-
mony to held that there was enough evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether
the defendents' conduct was a substantial factor in Wilson's death. See id.
115. See Wilson, 271 Cal Rptr. at 898. The defendants argued that the
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of Appeals found that the language in Wickline, stating that the dis-
charge decision was the sole responsibility of the treating physician, was
dicta. Therefore, the appeals court determined that this language was
unnecessary to trial court's decision.116
The court classified the language as "broadly stated" and emphasized
that it did not "correctly state the law relative to causation issues in a
tort case."' 17 As a result, the Wilson court opened the door for injured
plaintiffs to sue their MCOs if the denial of benefits is a "substantial
factor" in bringing about the injury and no rule of law relieves the MCO
of liability)'
8
C. ERISA Preemption: Corcoran v. United Healthcare
Although some state courts have recognized MCO liability, most have
succumbed to the preemption of state law claims by the Early Retire-
ment and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).n 9 Congress originally
enacted ERISA to encourage employers to form employee benefit
plans.120 However, employer-sponsored plans use ERISA to escape li-
Wickline decision can be interpreted to mean that a strong public policy in favor of
utilization review supports a judgment in their favor. See id. at 884. However, the
court rejected this argument holding that, unlike the Wickline decision, no public
policy exception applied. Id
116. See id. at 883.
117. Id In Wilson, one of the treating physicians testified that Wilson's.
inability to pay for the treatment was the sole reason for the patient's discharge,
and that Wilson would probably be alive had he stayed in the hospital. See id
118. See Wilson, 271 Cal Rptr. at 883; see also Beardan & Maedgen, supra
note 6, at 328 (arguing that the Wilson court left open the question of MCO liability
for adverse utilization review decisions); Pedroza, supra note 4, at 426. "[T1he
Wilson decision may indicate that a change in the health care delivery system will
foster change in our understanding of the different elements of causation." Id.
"Third party payors will no longer be exempt from cause in fact because the physi-
cian or the patient made the final say in the treatment decision." Id. "Rather, the
third party payor will be held to have satisfied the cause in fact determination any
time their decision amounts to a 'substantial factor' in the injury of the patient." Id.
119. See29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
120. See Little, supra note 74, at 1464-65. ERISA protects employee pen-
sion plans by requiring participation (1) by an employer engaged in interstate
commerce, (2) by any employee organization representing employees engaged in
commerce, or (3) by both. See Kilcullen, supra note 105, at 36 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (b) (1994)). In addition to requiring participation, ERISA establishes both
financial and fiduciary responsibilities. See id. ERISA also allows actions to be
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ability wilth regard to negligent medical decisions. More specifically,
ERISA protects interstate employers from being subjected to multiple
state laws by preempting "any and all state laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."'' 21 Thus, injured
plaintiffs bringing state law tort claims will only receive lost benefits if
their clairris are governed by ERISA. In essence, ERISA governs claims
which relate "to an employee benefit plan."' 2 The Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that a state law "relates to" a benefit plan if the law
has a "connection with or reference to" a benefit plan.' 3 Although there
is no clear evidence that Congress intended ERISA to shield MCOs from
liability, many state courts interpret the "relates to" language broadly.1
2 4
brought in federal court to "recover benefits due [a participant or beneficiary] under
the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." Id.
121. Malinowski, supra note 6, at 363 (noting that "any state legislation,
common law rule, or regulation such as wrongful death liability, that 'relates to' an
employee bemefit plan is preempted."). See Corey J. Ayling, New Developments in
ERISA Preemption and Judicial Oversight of Managed Care, 31 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 403, 406 (1998). Congress never intended such a broad preemption in the
context of health insurance and state law claims of negligence. See id. Moreover,
there is the need for change with respect to the broad preemption of ERISA. See
id.
122. Malinowski, supra note 6, at 363.
123. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). The Court noted
that "some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote,
or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law relates to the plan." Id at
100.
124. See Little, supra note 74, at 1465 (citing Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health
Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA
preempts a wrongful death suit in which the MCO initially refused and then de-
layed approval for heart surgery); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937,
943 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissing a claim for wrongful death after a MCO denied
psychiatric benefits and the patient subsequently committed suicide); Spain v.
Aetna Life is. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling that ERISA preempts
a suit in which a MCO refused to authorize and later delayed approval for a bone
marrow transplant)). But see Dukes v. U.S. Health Care, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 351 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding that tort claim was not preempted); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d
637 (10th Cir. 1995); Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th
Cir. 1995). See also Malinowski, supra note 6, at 364 (noting that ERISA may
provide soie minimal relief in the context of benefit denials). "While Section 502
(a) of ERISA does provide some relief, it is limited to the value of benefits denied."
Id. ERISA, however, does not provide a remedy for "lost wages, pain and suffer-
ing, or other damages available under state tort law." Id
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As a result, millions of Americans are left without a remedy for the
negligence of their MCOs. One commentator states:
ERISA's preemption of liability of health care plans, but not the
individual physician, is an outdated government incentive that
disrupts competition and robs consumers of well-established
remedies. It removes a powerful incentive to provide quality
service at a time when the government itself has failed to shoul-
der that responsibility directly through a national health care
program. Ultimately, coverage without quality assurance and re-
form without relief would mean that the health care revolution
has only circled back to the status quo.
125
In Corcoran v. United HealthCare, U6 the Fifth Circuit held that since
United Healthcare was a "plan administrator," Mrs. Corcoran's claim
was preempted by ERISA.127 In Corcoran, an MCO denied an obstetri-
cian's request to allow Corcoran to remain hospitalized. Because Cor-
coran was in a "high risk pregnancy" category, her physician felt that
she should stay in the hospital for monitoring.128 However, United
Healthcare, an independent review organization, denied Mrs. Corcoran
the benefit of a longer hospital stay, and instead authorized ten hours per
day of home nursing care.1 29 Mrs. Corcoran was discharged and, during
a time when no nurse was on duty, her unborn child went into distress
and died. 30
Mrs. Corcoran and her husband brought a wrongful death action in
Louisiana state court alleging that their unborn child died as a result of
the negligence of Blue Cross and United Healthcare. The defendants
removed the case to federal court, arguing that it was preempted by
ERISA."' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mrs. Cor-
125. Kilcullen, supra note 105, at 50.
126. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
127. See id. at 1322.
128. See id
129. See id. at 1323-24.
130. See id. Under a portion of the plan known as the "Quality Care Pro-
gram," participants were required to obtain precertification before hospital admis-
sion. See id. The quality care program was administered by defendant United
Healthcare under an agreement with Bell. See id. United Healthcare performed
utilization review services to reduce costs of the plan. See id.
131. See id. at 1324-25. Blue Cross was the insurance company responsi-
ble for employing United to conduct the utilization review. See id. at 1323. The
plaintiffs argued that the defendant's refusal to permit the hospitalization was an
erroneous medical decision. See id at 1324. The defendant argued that its deci-
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coran had no right to sue her HMO for damages because her insurance
plan was governed by ERISA.132 As a result, when a state claim deals
with a denial of benefits under a utilization review, the claim will likely
be preempted by ERISA.133 However, other courts have held that when a
claim is a based on simple state common law negligence, it will not be
preempted. 34 Since this issue remains unresolved and state courts are in
disarray regarding MCO liability, Congress should clarify the intentions
of ERISA 35
IV. MANAGED CARE UNDER SIEGE
The number of Americans enrolled in HMOs totals nearly seventy
million. There has been a fifty percent increase in the number of Ameri-
cans enrolled in HMOs over the the last four years. 136 Although man-
sion was not primarily a medical decision, but instead was a decision made as a
plan fiduciary concerning what benefits were available under the plan. See id. at
1325.
132. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1322. The Court concluded that the de-
fendant, in fact, made medical decisions, and even gave medical advice, but it did
so in the context of making a determination about the availability of benefits under
the plan. ld.
133. See id; see also McManus v. Travelers Health Network, 742 F.Supp.
377, 382 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Scullion v. Travelers Health Network, 720 F. Supp.
530, 531 (V/.D. Pa. 1989).
134. See, e.g., Kohn v. Delaware Valley HMO, No. 91-2745, 1992 WL
22241 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1992) (holding no ERISA preemption); Independence
HMO v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding no ERISA preemption).
135. See Kilcullen, supra note 105, at 50.
ERISA's preemption actually served to deprive [the patient] of a
state. law right: "[w]hile we are not unmindful of the fact that our
interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies
within a statute intended to protect participants in employee bene-
fit plans... the lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-
emption analysis." The result embodies the public's worst night-
mare about managed care, where issues of cost battle issues of
heafth. Under ERISA the desire to prevent escalation of costs to
busiinesses prevailed: [A]lthough imposing liability might have the
salutary effect of deterring poor quality medical decisions, there is
significant risk that state liability rules would be applied differ-
ently to the conduct of utilization review companies in different
states .... [This] would increase the cost of providing utilization
review services, thereby increasing the cost to health benefit plans
of including cost containment features . . . and ultimately de-
creasing the pool of plan funds available to reimburse participants.
Id. at 42 (footnotes omitted).
136.. See Stephen Green, Congress To Focus On Health Care Reform: Key
Issue Will Be Requiring Longer Hospital Stays, SAN DIEGO UNiON-TRIB., Jan. 3,
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aged care is somewhat effective at controlling health care costs, the
overall quality of health care has diminished. "Managed care is winning
in the heath care marketplace but is in danger of losing the battle for
public opinion."' 37 The misfortunes associated with cost containment
have added fuel to the managed care fire.138 The public's fear of man-
1998, at A21. See generally Picinic, supra note 77 (highlighting the dramatic rise
in participation in MCOs over the last several years).
137. Green, supra note 136, at A21 (quoting Drew Altman, president of
the Kaiser Family Foundation). See Neil B. Caesar, What's in Store for Physicians
When a Market Enters Phase III, MANAGED CARE, Jan. 1996, at 47 ("[M]any
health care physicians believe that they must go along with any managed care op-
portunity no matter how unattractive, and no matter how disorganized or arrogant
the MCO.").
Cost containment mechanisms such as utilization review, capita-
tion, and payment incentives limit treatment and encourage health
care providers to cut costs. Aphysician has an ethical and legal
duty to put the patient's needs first; however, the pressure to con-
tain costs and the incentive to make more money by cutting treat-
ment costs may cloud a physician's jumenent about a patient's
medical treatment. When determininmededical treatment or a pa-
tient, a doctor should not consider wa is best for the managed
care plan. Nevertheless, through bonuses and other incentives, the
MCO pressures physicians to do just that or risk personal financial
ruin.
Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 221 n.88 (citations omitted). But see Green, supra
note 136, at A21. While it is true that 52% of respondents wanted the government
to protect members of HMOs, it is also true that 40% were opposed if extra costs
were involved. See id
138. See generally Faber Walsh, supra note 15. U.S. Senator Alphonse
D'Amato (R-New York) compiled the following examples:
In New York, a diabetic developed an infection in his foot that had
become gangrenous and had spread all the way to his groin. Al-
most his entire leg was infected and the blood vessels clogged.
The patient was admitted to the hospital where he was immedi-
ately treated with intravenous antibiotics to combat the infection.
The doctor estimated that it would be medically necessary for the
patient to remain in the hospital for ten to fifteen additional days.
Upon learning this, a MCO official went to the patient's hospital
room, and without even notifying the doctor, tolc[ the man that "he
could watch Oprah and be treated as well from home with a visit-
ing nurse." Against the doctor's protests and with fluid still
draining from his wounds, the patient was discharged from the
hospital several days early. As a result of the early discharge from
the hospital and inadequate care, the patient had to postpone much
needed surgery, because his blood had become too thin to perform
surgery sately.
In Colorado a 75-year old woman was diagnosed with kidney
cancer, but her plan refused to authorize surgery to remove the
kidney and tumor of the elderly woman. The plan only relented
and allowed the surgery to be performed when a Congressman fi-
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aged care, coupled with the crippling effects of ERISA on state attempts
to reform managed care, have prompted a federal response.
139
President Clinton's "patients' bill of rights" attempts to bring "qual-
ity" back into health care.140 Although recent bills were defeated in
Congress, provisions of the bills continue to be very important issues.
These issues include:
1. In:Formation disclosure. This requires plans to give consum-
er; facts about benefits and exclusions, doctor credentials
and hospital track records.
2. Choice of Providers and Plans. This establishes direct access
to specialists for patients with serious medical conditions.
3. Access to Emergency Services. This provides coverage when
lack of such care would cause serious jeopardy.
4. Participation in Treatment Decisions. This gives consumers
information on treatment risks, benefits and alternatives, and
any financial arrangements influencing decisions. In addi-
tion, "gag" clauses forbidding doctors from disclosing all
treatment options are banned.
5. Nondiscrimination. This bars bias in health care based on
race, religion, age, sex, disability, genetic risks or source of
payment.
6. Confidentiality. This protects privacy of medical informa-
tion.
7. Complaints and Appeals. This sets internal and external ap-
peals processes, and requires decisions involving emergency
care to be resolved in seventy-two hours, consistent with
Medicare rules.1
4 1
Members of the Democratic and Republican parties introduced bills to
protect patient rights. 142 Even though this session of Congress ended
nally intervened on her behalf. The lady's cancer is now in full
rertassion.
143 Cong. Rec. S3665 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997).
139. See Chase, supra note 10, at BI.
140. See id. President Clinton's bill of rights was described by Robert
Blendon, e health policy professor at Harvard University, as "[a] mild piece of
consumer protection law that corresponds to a lot of other protections in areas such
as air safety and banking." Clinton Signs Act, supra note 10, at A16.
141. Chase, supra note 10, at B1. (noting the major provisions of the pro-
posed Patients Bill of Rights).
142. See 143 Cong. Rec. S3665 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997); H.R. Rep. No.
820 (1997); H.R. Rep. No. 1415 (1997); H.R. Rep. No. 3605 (1998); H.R. Rep. No.
6403 (1998); see also Green, supra note 136, at A21. U.S. Congressman Greg
Ganske (R-Iowa), a plastic surgeon, said, "[q]uite simply, the leadership doesn't
1998]
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without any movement in managed care reform, patient's rights will
highlight the legislative agenda again next year.143 Clearly, the biparti-
san support generated by the tragedies associated with managed care
highlights the significance of the pending problem. 44 It is important to
speak for most Republicans on this issue." Id Congressman Ganske also said that
GOP leaders fail "to understand that an overwhelming majority of Americans favor
legislation to protect them from a health care system that seems increasingly con-
cerned with charts of the plan's financial fortunes, not charts of the patient's
health." Id.
143. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605 (1998). See also Harriet Hiland,
Washington Has Choice In Managed-Care Bills, Bus. J.-PHOENIx, Feb. 13, 1998,
at 20. Two republican congressmen, Rep. Charlie Norwood (Georgia) and Sen.
Alfonse D'Amato introduced bills that would have regulated MCOs and would
have given patients the right to sue their MCO under state laws. See Green, supra
note 136, at A21. Two democratic congressmen, Sen. Edward Kennedy (Massa-
chusetts) and Rep. John Dingell (Michigan), "have sponsored bills that would im-
pose consumer protections on MCOs, including guaranteeing access to medical
specialists." Id. A bill co-sponsored by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Califomia),
D'Amato, and Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) "would require HMOs to allow a
several day hospital stay for women undergoing mastectomies and reconstructive
surgery." Id. Ganske and Rep. Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts) "have spon-
sored a bill that would prohibit so-called gag clauses, which forbid physicians from
discussing with patients treatments not authorized by the MCO." Id According to
Congressman Norwood, "if the [Democrats] come out with their own bill they're
going to divide the bipartisan support that we have now... raising the possibility
that we could turn what needs to be done into a campaign commercial." Id For a
discussion about the managed care debate, see Amy Goldstein & Helen Dewar,
Senate Kills 'Patients' Rights Bill; Managed-Care Measure a Victim of Partisan-
ship, Clinton Scandal, Lobbying, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1998 at Al.
Weeks before the Senate killed HMO reform yesterday on a pro-
cedural vote, it had been a forgone conclusion that creating a pa-
tient's bill of rights' was destined to land on the stack of legisla-
tion that the 105th Congress would not pass. Remarkably, the is-
sue collapsed even though Democrats and Republicans in both
chambers declared that they would like nothing more than a new
law this year to grant patients in health plans more clout-and
even though the polls showed that no other action by Congress
would be as welcomed by the American people.
Id.
144. See, e.g., H.R. 1415 (1997). The Patient Access to Responsible Care
Act of 1997 ("PARCA") was introduced by Rep. Norwood. Id Until recently, it
was speculated that PARCA had the most momentum with as many as 219 spon-
sors. See Hiland, supra note 143, at 20. But see House Democrats Plan To Offer
Own Managed Care Bill, CONG. DAILY, Feb. 4, 1998. PARCA was attacked by
business and insurance industries that claimed it would raise costs to the point
where employers would be forced to drop health coverage. See id For these rea-
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outline thi- major provisions that were part of recent patients' rights
legislation and discuss their possible impact on health-care delivery.
A. Freedom of Information
Future ]legislation in the health care arena should require MCOs to
disclose information to patients about health care benefits, appeals pro-
cedures, performance measures, history of patient satisfaction, as well as
the number and type of physicians participating in the MCO.' 41 Full dis-
closure will enable a patient to become aware of the full range of avail-
able treatment options. 46 In turn, patients will be better equipped to
make informed decisions about their health care. Moreover, .full disclo-
sure of a MCO's financial incentives will help reestablish trust in the
sons, PARCA lost some of its momentum. See id. ("I've really seen a change in
the atmosphere on Capitol Hill with respect to PARCA," quoting Karen Ignagni,
president ofthe American Association of Health Plans). "A lot of individuals who
have signed onto PARCA are not aware of the range of issues and full implica-
tions." See id.
145. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 121 (1998). The Patients Bill of
Rights Act {PBRA) would have required health plans to disclose the following:
(1) Service area, benefits, and any exclusions;
2 disclosure of the medical loss ratio of the plan;
how the plan provides out of area coverage;
(4 the number, mix, and distribution of participating health pro-
fessionals and providers;
(5) the ratio of enrollees to participating health professionals
and providers by category and type of health professional
and provider;
(6) the expenditures and utilization per enrollee by category and
type of health professional and provider;
(7) a .escription of the appropriate use of emergency services;
(8) utilization review requirements of the issuer (including prior
authorization review, concurrent review, post-payment re-
view, and any other procedures that may lead to denial of
coverage or payment for a service;
9) financial arrangements and incentives- and
(10 grievance procedures and appeals rigats under the coverage,
and summary information about the number and disposition of
grievances and appeals in the most recent period for which com-
plete and accurate information is available.
Id.
146. See Swanson, supra note 6, at 332 (arguing that a patient has a right
to know what financial incentives are being offered to physicians to reduce care
and referrals to specialists, as well as what reimbursement system is being used).
"Financial incentives and resource constraints utilized by MCOs and physicians
must be fuilly disclosed to patients." Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 243. Specifi-
cally, the author found that "patients have the right to know the financial incentives
that may impact the course of their medical care and treatment." Id
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patient-physician relationship.1
47
However, full disclosure of financial arrangements may aggravate a
patient's existing apathy toward managed care. 48 For example, if a pa-
tient seeking treatment for what he or she believes is a serious upper
respiratory infection is sent home without a remedy, he or she will be
skeptical of this diagnosis if he or she knows that the physician is en-
couraged to limit care. 49 Nevertheless, a fully informed patient will be
better situated to assess his or her treatment options and a physician who
provides such information will be in compliance with the ethical and
legal obligations of the informed consent doctrine.1
50
B. Prohibiting the Use of Financial Incentives to Limit Care
MCOs should be prohibited from using financial incentives to influ-
ence doctors to deny or limit medically necessary health care.'.5 Many
147. See Amy Goldstein, Clinton Backs Bill of Rights for Patients; Presi-
dent to Seek Law to Enforce Standards, WASH. POST., Nov. 20, 1997, at Al.
148. See Swanson, supra note 6, at 318.
Patients need to have trust in their doctors, and when doctors are
not allowed to tell patients candidly what they think about a par-
ticular plan or treatment, HMOs begin chipping away at that rela-
tionship. In a world where doctors are not allowed to discuss the
full range of relevant treatments with their ailing patients, are un-
able to tell them when substandard labs are used for crucial diag-
nostic tests and are unable to advise them about which health plan
best suits their individual needs, it is society as a whole that suf-
fers.
Id.
149. See Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 221 n.8:
As the health care industry moves toward managed care and away
from traditional medicine, the physician-patient relationship is al-
tered. The physician-patient relationship is viewed as a fiduciary
relationship whereby the physician owes his patient a fundamental
duty to put the patient's medical needs above all other personal
interests. A patient places cornplete trust in his doctor to care for
him and provide the best medical treatment possible. A doctor
takes a Hippocratic oath to provide the best possible medical care
for the sick above all other interests. The relationship between the
patient and physician is held in the highest regard, as the most im-
portant relationship in medicine. However, managed care intro-
duces a third party into the previously exclusive doctor-patient re-
lationship. As a provider in a MCO, a physician must abide by his
ethical duty to the patient to provide the best medical treatment
possible, and at the same time adhere to cost containment mecha-
nisms and limitations set forth in their contracts with the MCOs.
Id. (citations omitted).
150. See id. at 242-43.
151. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 142 (1998). PBRA would have pro-
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commentators criticize the use of financial incentives to limit care. 152
Others argue that the financial incentives are necessary to contain health
care costs.153 Without the financial restraints, physicians may revert
back to their old ways of overutilization. 154 This over-treatment will lead
to unnecessary costs that managed care plans were designed to
prevent.1
55
Arguably, any legislation which restricts a MCO's ability to cut costs
would undermine the sole purpose of managed care, which is to provide
quality health care at an affordable cost. Indeed, cost containment
mechanisms are useful at minimizing soaring health care costs.156 A re-
ward to physicians for cutting the fat out of health care is a good idea,
hibited improper incentive arrangements. See id. Currently, some physicians are
reluctant to refer patients to specialists because of financial penalties imposed on
the doctor a; a result of such referral. See id. PBRA would have limited a MCO's
ability to transfer liability and it would have restricted its ability to utilize financial
incentives to limit care. See id. PBRA read in part as follows:
(b) PROHIBITION OF IMPROPER PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE
LANS IN GENERAL - A group health plan and a health insur-
ance: issuer offering health insurance coverage may not operate
any physician incentive plan (as defined in subparagraph (B) of
section 1876(i)(8) of the Social Security Act) unless the require-
ments described in subparagraph (A) of such section are met with
respect to such a plan.See id.
152. See Orentlicher, supra note 6, at 161.
153. See Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 240-41.
Managed care, and its use of cost containment mechanisms, such
as utilization review, capitation and financial incentives, was cre-
ated to help stem the rising cost of quality health care. Under the
fee-ror-service arrangement physicians over-utilize medical serv-
ices and in turn drive up the cost of quality medical care. Al-
though the long term impact of managed care on the health care
industry is unknown, the short term effect of managed care is to
lower the cost of quality health care. The prohibition of cost con-
tain ment mechanisms eliminates the incentive to render only
medically necessary services.
Id
154. See id at 241. Overutilization is a term used to describe doctors
authorizing potentially excessive diagnostic tests and treatments. See id.
155. See id Additional costs are problematic because they will often be
passed on to patients, and if costs rise too high, patients will no longer be able to
afford health care. See id Managed care was designed to reduce health care costs
to a level tat patints could afford. See Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 241.
156. See id at 215. Managed care attempts to provide quality health care
in a cost-etfective manner. See id The author discusses the history of managed
care and its effect on the cost of health care. See id. at 210-15.
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but a physician should not be encouraged to forego medically necessary
treatments for financial reasons.1 57 As a result, future legislation should
prohibit only those financial incentives that influence doctors to deny or
limit medically necessary care while continuing to allow an MCO to
contain costs. 58 An important distinction between the Democratic and
Republican proposals brought before the 105th Congress was who de-
cides what is "medically necessary." Under the Republican proposal,
medical necessity was defined by the health plan, whereas the Demo-
cratic proposal leaves this determination to health care professionals.
159
C. Granting Patients the Freedom of Choice
Patients should have increased access to doctors and specialists of
their choice. 160 Patients should no longer be forced to see a preferred
provider and should, in some cases, be able to go to their family
doctors. 161 While increasing the availability of physicians may lead to
increased costs, the cost of a particular patient's care would inevitably
decrease as a result of enhanced quality of care. 62 For example, patients
157. See id. at 219-20.
158. See id.; see also, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 142 (1998). PBRA
would have permitted financial arrangements whereby a physician could still cut
utilization without jeopardizing the quality of care that is required. See id
159. Compare H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 132 (1998) (providing that an ap-
pealable decision must be reviewed by a health care professional) with H.R. Rep.
No. 6403, § 1201(b) (1998) (providing that appealable decisions shall be reviewed
by an appropriate named fiduciary).
160. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 103 (1998). PBRA would have re-
quired health plans to offer patients the freedom to choose among available primary
care providers and specialty care providers. See H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 103 (1998).
The health plan may limit a patient's choice to a set number of specialty providers
if the plan has notified the patient of such limitations. See H.R. Rep. No. 3605,
§ 103 (1998).
161. See id.
162. See 143 Cong. Rec. 53666 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997). Senator
D'Amato noted that:
In Georgia, a 2-year old boy was suffering from a high fever that did not re-
spond to medication. His parents followed the insurance company's instruc-
tions for pre-authorization of emergency room care and attempted to drive 42
miles to the preferred hospital. The couple passed five emergency rooms
along the way. Before they could reach the preferred hospital, their son went
into cardiac arrest and stopped breathing. The child slipped into coma, devel-
oped gangrene in his extremities, and subsequently lost his arms and legs to
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permitted to see their regular doctors would benefit the MCO in two
ways. First, the patient would be more compliant with treatment recom-
mendations if they came from his or her regular doctor. Second, a physi-
cian who has seen a patient for years can better assess his or her present
conditions and, in turn, will be able to keep medical costs to a minimum.
Most notably, patients with special conditions should have access to
specialists with the requisite expertise to treat their problems.163 Cur-
rently, most health plans will charge patients more when they seek care
outside the network without considering the patient's problem or the
provider's particular expertise. Moreover, legislation in this area should
address the special health care needs of women and children.16 For ex-
amputation.
Id.
163. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 104 (1998). PBRA would have al-
lowed patients with serious on-going medical conditions to choose a specialist to
coordinate their primary and specialty care. See H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 104 (1998).
The patient would be able to access this specialty provider without a referral from a
primary care provider within the network. See H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 104 (1998).
164. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 103-104 (1998). PBRA's access to
specialty care provision would have established certain standards to ensure access
to appropriate specialty care as follows:
Sec. 103. CHOICE OF PROVIDERS.
(a) PRIMARY CARE- A group health plan, and a health insur-
ance issuer that offers health insurance coverage, shall permit each
parti:ipant, beneficiary, and enrollee to receive primary care from
any participating primary care provider who is available to accept
such individual.
Sb) PECIALISTS-
1 IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2) a group health plan
anda health insurance issuer that offers healt insurance coverage
shall permit each participant, beneficiary or enrollee to receive
medically necessary or appropriate specialty care, pursuant to ap-
propriate referral procedures, from any qualified participating
health care provider who is available to accept such individual for
such care.
f(2) LIMITATION- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to specialty care
if the plan or issuer clearly ihforms participants, beneficiaries, and
enrollees of the limitations on choice of participating providers
with respect to such care.
Sec. 104. ACCESS TO SPECIALTY CARE.
a) OBSTETRICAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL CARE-
1) IN GENERAL- If a group health plan, or a health insurance
issuer in connection with the provision of health insurance cover-
age requires or provides for a participant, beneficiary, or enrollee
to designate a participating primary care provider-
(A.) the plan or issuer shall permit such an individual who is a
fematle to designate a participating physician who specializes in
obstetrics and gynecology as the individual's primary care pro-
vider; and
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ample, women should have direct access to ob/gyn care and the ability
to designate their ob/gyn as their primary care provider. 65 Likewise,
children with special medical conditions should have direct access to
pediatric specialists.1
66
MCOs should be required to have enough doctors to satisfy the de-
mand dictated by their patients. Moreover, health plans should maintain
a sufficient variety and geographical distribution of providers to ensure
that patients receive covered services on a timely basis. Giving patients
the freedom to choose their medical providers will enhance the quality
of health care because patients, who are limited in their choice of pro-
viders and access to specialists, will not receive the care necessary to
address their medical needs. Along these lines, approximately thirty-two
states have enacted some form of "any willing provider" statute to en-
hance the accessibility of health care. 167 The state statutes have the dual
purpose of promoting patient choice and securing physician access to
preferred provider organizations.168 However, since many states' "any
willing provider" laws were preempted by ERISA, federal legislation is
necessary to enhance a patient's freedom of choice.
69
In addition, MCOs should offer patients a variety of plans from which
to choose. 70 The MCO "could then pass the additional costs onto the
.(B) if such an individual has not designated such a provider as a
primary care provider, the plan or issuer-
(i) may not require authorization or a referral by the individ-
ual's primary care provider or otherwise for coverage of routine
gynecological care (such as preventive women's health examina-
tions) and pregnancy-related services provided by a participating
health care professional who specializes in obstetrics and gynecol-
ogy to the extent such care is otherwise covered, and
• (ii) may treat the ordering of other gynecological care by such a
participating physician" as the authorization of the primary care
provider with respect to such care under the plan or coverage.
H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 103-104 (1998).
165. See H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 103-104 (1998).
166. For example, if a child needed a pediatric neurologist, but the plan
only had an adult neurologist, that plan would refer the child to an outside special-
ist at no extra cost to the family. See H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 103-104 (1998).
167. See Swanson, supra note 6, at 320.
168. See id.
169. See generally Margaret G. Farrel, ERISA Preemption and Regulation
of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J. L. & MED.
251 (1997) (noting that ERISA preemption has had a profound impact on the qual-
ity of health care).
170. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 102 (1998). PBRA would have re-
quired health plans of employers, who offer only a closed panel HMO, to offer the
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consumers in the form of higher premiums or larger deductibles. Most
importantly, the patient will be making the treatment decisions.171 Un-
like MCOs, which operate on large-scale economics, an individual pa-
tient may not let cost factors influence his or her decision, and should be
permitted to pay for the medical services on his or her own.1 72 "The pa-
tient should be aware what his health dollar will and will not purchase;
if he and his doctor decide he needs something not paid for under the
HMO, it should be his option to pay for it himself."
173
D. Greater Access to Emergency Services
Patients :;hould be able to receive emergency medical care without the
burden of seeking prior approval from their MCOs.174 Recent proposals
employees an opportunity to purchase a point of sale option in addition to the basic
plan offered through the employer. See H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 102 (1998).
171. See 143 Cong. Rec. S3667 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997).
172. See id. For example, a patient suffering from chronic back pain could
choose a MCO that would agree to cover preventative back therapy notwithstand-
ing the fact that no preventative back therapy is provided by the MCO. See id. The
MCO would reimburse the costs of these services based on rates consistent with
those negotiated under the plan. See id The patient would then be responsible for
any remaining costs associated with treatment. See id
173. Swanson, supra note 6, at 320.
174. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 101 (1998).
Sec. 101. ACCESS TO EMERGENCY CARE.
a ,COVERAGE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES-
() IN GENERAL- If a group health plan, or health insurance
coverage offered by a health insurance issuer provides any bene-
fits with respect to emergency services (as defined in paragraph
(2)( ), the plan or issuer shall cover emergency services ffir-
nishedunder the plan or coverage-
(A) without the need for any prior authorization determination;
(q) whether or not the health care provider furnishing such
services is a participating provider with respect to such services;(C) in a manner so that, if such services are provided to a par-
ticip1nt, beneficiary, or enrollee by a nonparticipating health care
provider-
(i) the participant, beneficiary, or enrollee is not liable for
amounts that exceed the amounts of liability that would be in-
curred if the services were provided by a participating health care
provider, and
(ii) the plan or issuer pays an amount that is not less than the
amount paid to a participating health care provider for the same
services; and
(E!) without regard to any other term or condition of such cover-
age Iother than exclusion or coordination of benefits, or an affilia-
tion or waiting period, permitted under section 2701 of the Public
Health Service Act, section 701 of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, or section 9801 of the Internal Reve-
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assert that patients must have access to emergency care, without prior
authorization, in any situation that a "prudent lay person" would regard
as an emergency.175 To require pre-approval for emergency treatment is
a contradiction of terms. The following real life situation affords an ex-
ample. In Texas, a seventeen-year-old girl was critically injured in a
head-on car crash that left her with severe head trauma, a broken back, a
crushed pelvis, and numerous other injuries. 176 The girl eventually sur-
vived, but her health plan refused to pay $40,000 of her hospital bill
because her family had not received "prior authorization" for her emer-
gency admission.177 Indeed, the imminence of an emergency and the dire
consequences of delayed treatment necessitate emergency treatment
without pre-approval.
E. Equal Protection and Discrimination
In the health care arena, MCOs should be prohibited from discrimi-
nating against patients and physicians.178 Future legislation should re-
quire health plans to have a written, objective process for provider se-
lection and should forbid discrimination against doctors based on li-
cense, location, or patient base.179 Under the current system, MCOs are
nue Code of 1986, and other than applicable cost-sharing).
(2) DEFINITIONS- In this section:
(A) EMERGENCY MEDICAL CONDITION BASED ON
PRUDENT LAYPERSON STANDARD- The term 'emergency
medical condition' means a medical condition manifesting itself
by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain)
such that a prudent layperson, who possesses an average kfiowl-
edge of health and medicine, could reasonably expect the absence
of immediate medical attention to result in a condition described
in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of section 1867(e)(1)(A) of the Social Se-
curity Act.
H.R. 3605, § 101 (1998).
175. See H.R. 3605, § 101 (1998).
176. See 143 Cong. Rec. S3665-66 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997).
177. See id.
178. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 109 (1998). PBRA would have pro-
hibited a health plan from discriminating, directly or through contractual arrange-
ments, in any activity that has the effect of discriminating against an individual on
the basis of race, national origin, gender, language, sexual orientation, genetic in-
formation, or source of payment. See id.
179. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 113. PBRA read in part as follows:
Sec. 113. PROCESS FOR SELECTION OF PROVIDERS.
(a) IN GENERAL- A group health plan and a health insurance is-
suer that offers health insurance coverage shall, if it provides
benefits through participating health care professionals, have a
written process for the selection of participating health care pro-
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able to dis-riminately select only those doctors who will comply with
their cost containment mandates. °80 Thus, a physician, who puts quality
above cost, is subject to a penalty for practicing "good medicine." As a
result, anti-discrimination legislation will enable those physicians, who
seek to improve quality, to become members of the health care team.
In addition, patients should be protected from discrimination based on
their medical background or pre-existing conditions.181 This will ensure
that the patients in the most need for care receive that care. For example,
under the current system, an MCO could manufacture a utopian mem-
bership made up of only healthy individuals with no pre-existing condi-
tions. In turn, the individuals with long-term diseases will be left with-
out health (.overage, or coverage that is too cost-prohibitive for them to
fessionals, including minimum professional requirements.
(b) VERIFICATION OF BACKGROUND- Such process shall
include verification of a health care provider's license and a his-
to of suspension or revocation.
(c) RESTRICTION- Such process shall not use a high-risk pa-
tient base or location of a provider in an area with residents with
poorer health status as a basis for excluding providers from par-
ticipation.
(d) NONDISCRIMINATION BASED ON LICENSURE-
(1) IN GENERAL- Such process shall not discriminate with re-
spect to participation or indemnification as to any provider who is
acting within the scope of the provider's license or certification
under applicable State law, solely on the basis of such license or
certification.
(2) CONSTRUCTION- Paragraph (1) shall not be construed-
(A) as requiring the coverage under a plan or coverage of par-
ticular benefits or services or to prohibit a plan or issuer from in-
cludingproviders only to the extent necessary to meet the needs of
the plans or issuer's participants, beneficiaries, or enrollees or
from establishing any measure designed to maintain quality and
control costs consistent with the responsibilities of the plan or is-
suer; or
(B) to override any State licensure or scope-of-practice law.
e) GENERAL NONDISCRIMINATION-
I GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), such process shall not
discriminate with respect to selection of a health care professional
to be: a participating health care provider, or with respect to the
ternm and conditions of such participation, based on the profes-
sional's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, sexual ori-
entation, or disability (consistent with the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990).
H.R. Rep.Nc,. 3605, § 113.
180. See Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 207 (discussing how MCOs influ-
ence physicians economically to institute cost containment); Orentlicher, supra
note 6, at 155 (noting the various cost containment mechanisms utilized by MCOs);
Regan, supra note 5, at 635.
181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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maintain. Clearly, an anti-discrimination provision will prevent the dic-
tator-like MCO from eradicating sick individuals from their population.
F. Freedom of Speech: Prohibiting "Gag" Clauses
MCOs should be prohibited from limiting a physician's ability to dis-cuss treatment options with the patient.1 2 Moreover, protecting provid-
182. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 141. PBRA reads in part as follows:Sec. 141. PROHIBITION OF INTERFERENCE WITH CERTAINMEDICAL COMMUNICATIONS.
a PROHIBITION-
1) GENERAL RULE- The provisions of any contract or agree-ment, or the operation of any contract or agreement, between agroup health plan or health insurance issuer in relation to healthinsurance coverage (including any partnership, association, orother organization that enters into or administers such a contract oragreement) and a health care provider (or group of health careproviders) shall not prohibit or restrict the provider from engagingin medical communications with the provider's patient.(2) NULLIFICATION- Any contract provision or agreement de-scribed inparagrath (I shall be null and void.
.b consr Oe O RUCTION- Nothing in this section shallbe onstrued--
(1) to prohibit the enforcement, as part of a contract or agreementto which a health care provider is a party, of any mutually agreedupon terms and conditions, including terms and conditions re-quiring a health care provider to participate in, and cooperate with,all progams, policies and procedures developed or operated by agroup health plan or health insurance issuer to assure, review, orimprove the quality and effective utilization of health care services(if such utilization is according to guidelines or protocols that arebased on clinical or scientific evidence and the professional judg-ment of the provider) but only if the guidelines or protocols undersuch utilization do not prohibit or restrict medical communicationsbetween providers and their patients; or(2) to permit a health care provider to misrepresent the scope ofbenefits covered under the group health plan or health insurancecoverage or to otherwise require a group health plan health insur-ance issuer to reimburse providers or benefits not covered underthe plan or coverage.
(c) MEDICAL COMMUNICATION DEFINED- In this section:(1) IN GENERAL- The term 'medical communication' meansany communication made by a health care provider with a patientof the health care provider (or the guardian or legal representative
of such patient) with respect to-
tio(Any) the patient's health status, medical care, or treatment op-
(B an utilization review requirements that may affect treat-ment options for the patient; or(C) any financial incentives that may affect the treatment of thepatient.
(2) MISREPRESENTATION- The term 'medical communica-tion' does not include a communication by a health care providerwith a patient of the health care provider (or the guardian or legal
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ers in these situations from retribution will foster open communications
and help stabilize the patient-physician relationship.18 3 Although insur-
ance companies deny that "gag clauses" exist and downplay their nega-
tive effects on the quality of care, Congress should prohibit them for the
following reasons:
I. In accordance with the AMA's stance, "gag clauses" are un-
ethical and destructive to the doctor-patient relationship.
2. Since physicians are in the best position to influence treat-
meat, they should be able to speak freely to patients regard-
ing their alternatives.
3. While "gag clauses" may already be illegal under the com-
mon law doctrine of informed consent, it is often too diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to prove harm.
4. Even if a patient is successful in proving breach of informed
corsent, the inadequate remedy provided does nothing to
thwart future misfortunes in the delivery of health care.
5. While many state legislatures have recognized the need for
full disclosure laws, the laws are often pre-empted byERISA.'84
G. Amending ERISA: Piercing the MCO Liability Shield
Finally, ERISA should be amended to force MCOs to assume respon-
sibility for their adverse decisions. 85 Under the current system, MCOs
representative of such patient) if the communication involves a
kiowing or willful misrepresentation by such provider.
H.R. Rep. NO. 3605, § 141. But see, Little, supra note 74, at 1474. Legislation that
does not eliminate "at will" employment for physicians would be ineffectual. See
id "Because without procedural protections, forcing a MCO to provide justifiable
reasons for terminating a physician, laws disallowing gag clauses and requiring'full
disclosure o1 financial incentives are powerless to protect patients." Id. The reason
they are powerless is that the termination can act as a defacto gag clause by mak-
ing physicians silent out of fear that his disclosure to patients could result in his
termination. See id According to Diane Archer, executive director of Medicare
Rights Center, "The ability to terminate physicians without cause has perhaps the
greatest chilling effect on patient communications." Id.
183. See id. •
184. See 143 Cong. Rec. S3666 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997). See also gener-
ally Farrell, supra note 169 (noting in detail the effect ERISA preemption has had
on managed care).
185. See Little, supra note 74, at 1478; see also, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 3605,
§ 192 (1998). PBRA stated in part:
Sec. 192. PREEMPTION; STATE FLEXIBILITY;
CONSTRUCTION.
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can usually escape liability under the guise of ERISA preemption.18 6 For
example, an injured person can only recover the dollar value of the
benefit denied. As a result, MCOs are free to manipulate the quality of
health care in the U.S. A proposal that would allow state law to deter-
mine whether a health care beneficiary can bring a state cause of action
against health plans is a good solution. Amending ERISA would ensure
that MCOs could be held liable for denying treatment or influencing
doctors to limit medically necessary care.t8 7 However, "[h]olding MCOs
liable for the effects of cost-containment, defeats the purpose of these
organizations.' ' 8
_(a) CONTINUED APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW WITH
SPECT TO HEALTH INSURANCE ISSUERS-
(1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), this title shall not be
construed to supersede any provision of State law which estab-
lishes, implements, or continues in effect any standard or require-
ment solely relating to health insurance issuers in connection with
group health insurance coverage except to the extent that such
standard or requirement prevents the application of a requirement
of this title.
(2) CONTINUED PREEMPTION WITH RESPECT TO GROUP
HEALTH PLANS- Nothing in this title shall be construed to affect
or modify the provisions of section 514 of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 with respect to group health
plans.
(b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION- Except as provided in sec-
tions 152 and 153, nothing in this title shall be construed as re-
quiring a group health plan or health insurance coverage to pro-
vide specific benefits under the terms of such plan or coverage.
(c) DEFINITIONS- For purposes of this section:
STATE LAW- The term 'State law' includes all laws, deci-
sions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of
law, of any State. A law of the United States applicable only to the
District of Columbia shall be treated as a State law rather than a
law of the United States.
H.R. Rep. No. 3605, § 192 (1998).
186. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
187. For a full discussion of the Early Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), including an explanation of ERISA's broad implications on state
law remedies, see generally Kilcullen, supra note 105, at 7. See also Little, supra
note 74, at 1464-68 (explaining the impact of ERISA on legislative and judicial
protections for physicians and patients); Faber Walsh, supra note 15, at 222 n.93.
188. See Noah, supra note 6, at 1263. Another reason why MCOs are
shielded from liability is that the medical malpractice liability system was rooted in
the traditional fee-for-service health care delivery system. See Pedroza, supra note
4, at 431. Under a traditional fee-for-service system, physicians were required to
act as fiduciaries for their patients. See id. Moreover, the physician served as the
patient's sole "gatekeeper" and it was well known that over-treatment benefited
both the physician and the patient. See id Thus, it only made sense that the physi-
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Another potential problem is that the cost of defending lawsuits would
result in a rise in health care costs and could eventually lead us back to
the fee-for-service days of overutilization. However, 'the mere threat of
lawsuits would force the MCOs to relinquish control to physicians for
treatment decisions. Moreover, as most commentators agree, amending
ERISA to extend liability to MCOs for negligent treatment decisions
would ensure the quality of health care. 89
CONCLUSION
Under tihe traditional fee-for-service system, physicians over-utilized
medical services to guard against medical malpractice claims and to
increase the profit margin of their practices. As a result, health, care
costs were exorbitant and the era of managed care began. With their
alphabet soup of organizations such as HMOs, PPOs, and IPAs, man-
aged care organizations mounted an attack on the spiraling costs of
health care. The MCOs utilized a variety of cost containment mecha-
nisms to regain control of health care spending.
With economically based programs such as capitation, bonuses, risk
pools, and utilization review, MCOs have transformed health care deliv-
ery into a profit making business enterprise. Meanwhile, physicians,
pursuant to their contracts with MCOs, are gagged from communicating
cian alone was liable for any negligent medical decisions. See id. But, as health
care shifted to managed care, the liability system remained constant. See id. "The
tort system does not merely serve as a means of compensation for the injured, it
serves as a moral agent in our society, shaping peoples actions." Id Therefore, for
liability to be effective it must not only compensate the injured it must also provide
incentives to MCOs to prevent harm. See id.
More importantly, the threat of lawsuits -will motivate MCOs to increasingly
leave medical decisions to the.medical doctors. See id. The physician will again
become the :sole gatekeeper. See id The judicial system and state legislatures have
failed to provide physicians with adequate protections against dangerous policies
and ERISA presents an obstacle fot any judicial or legislative measures. See Noah,
supra note 6, at 1246-48. Comprehensive federal legislation is therefore necessary.
See id "Such federal legislation would be a major step in providing physicians
with the freedom necessary to restore safety and trust in America's health care
system." ' However, malpractice law places an enormous burden on managed
care organizations. See id. Money spent defending lawsuits could result in an
overall increase in health care costs. See id Also, the insistence on providing the
best available care to every patient continually drives up costs, which correlates to
increased pr.imiums. See id
189. See Noah, supra note 6, at 1246-48.
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financial incentives and treatment options to their patients. Moreover,
due to ERISA's broad preemption of state laws that "relate to" a benefit
plan, MCOs have destroyed the "quality" of health care without fear of
liability. As a result, patients are defenseless in the war against destruc-
tive health care delivery.
Just as Paul Revere's ride signaled our nation's independence, Presi-
dent Clinton has declared war on managed care with his proposed Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights. In response to Clinton's declaration, a bipartisan
effort in Congress has evolved to halt the destructive power of managed
care. Despite the inability of Congress to enact a patients' bill of rights
this term, the managed care reign of terror is drawing to a close. Many
managed care entities have voluntarily changed some of their policies.
However, in order to promote uniformity and maintain control of this
volatile area, federal action is necessary. Future legislation should foster
doctor-patient communications and allow patients to make informed
decisions about their health care. Legislation should prohibit financial
incentives from limiting medically necessary care and allow patients
greater access to services and providers. Moreover, discrimination by
MCOs should be eliminated and the ERISA liability shield should be
pierced to allow patients to sue their HMOs for inappropriate utilization
review decisions. Indeed, appropriate managed care legislation will
strike a nice balance by allowing MCOs to maintain cost control without
compromising the quality of health care delivery.
